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Horizontal Collusions Organized by Uber: Time for a
Change in Canada
Thanh Phan*
On 27 November 2018, the Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded that the
arbitration clause in the driver service contract between Uber Technologies Inc.
(Uber) and its drivers was invalid, paving the way for Uber drivers in Ontario to
seek a declaration that they are Uber’s employees.1 The final decision of the
drivers’ legal action has yet to be made, but treating drivers as employees may be
a solution for Uber to avoid possible antitrust lawsuits, which could result in
severe sanctions.
Uber provides on-demand transportation technology connecting riders and
drivers. When a rider makes a ride request by confirming the pickup location and
destination, Uber’s platform will share the ride request to nearby drivers and
only one driver can accept the request. The rider then pays the driver a fare pre-
arranged by Uber.2
Several studies have concluded that Uber’s platform is a price-fixing cartel
whereby Uber is the organizer and drivers are members, but these analyses have
four problems.3 First, the literature assumes that there is only one cartel among
Uber and its drivers, a perspective which is undermined by the counterargument
that it is unlikely for there to be the same set of drivers available on Uber at a
given time in a geographic area.4 Second, the authors do not clarify if there are
horizontal collusions among drivers. Third, they do not examine if the
agreements are naked or ancillary restraints. Fourth, the literature only
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1 Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., 2019 ONCA 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 74, affirmed 2020
CarswellOnt 8828, 2020 CarswellOnt 8829 (S.C.C.).
2 Uber, “How to use the Uber app” online: Uber <https://www.uber.com/ca/en/about/
how-does-uber-work/>.
3 See e.g.MaxHuffman, ‘‘The Sharing EconomyMeets the ShermanAct: Is Uber a Firm,
a Cartel, or Something in Between?,” Columbia Journal of Business Law 859 (2017): 862
[Huffman]; See also Julian Nowag, ‘‘The UBER-Cartel? UBER between Labour and
Competition Law” (2016), online: Lund Student EU Law Review, vol. 3: 4, <http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2826652> [Nowag].
4 See e.g. Spencer Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., [2020] 01-18-0002-1956 at 6 [Meyer].
focuses on price-fixing cartels, but no other possible collusions among Uber and
its drivers are explored.
This paper argues that Uber’s ordinary operation should be characterized as
organizing horizontal cartels among drivers that not only fix the fares of ride-
hailing services using its platform but also allocate customers. Uber-led cartels,
therefore, violate section 45(1) of the Competition Act5 of Canada. In doing so,
this paper analyzes the relationships between Uber and drivers and argues that (i)
Uber is the organizer of price-fixing and market allocation collusions among
drivers, (ii) the collusions are horizontal, and (iii) they are per se illegal.
The first section discusses the general structure of peer-to-peer markets. The
second section examines factors indicating the illegality of cartels organized by
Uber under the Competition Act of Canada. The last section will provide some
legal and technical solutions that may help Uber to remedy the anti-
competitiveness of its platform.
1. PEER-TO-PEER MARKETS
A peer-to-peer market refers to an online platform that makes it easier for
large numbers of fragmented sellers and buyers to trade goods or services in
exchange for money,6 for example, Uber, Airbnb,7 TaskRabbit,8 and
SkipTheDishes.9 This section discusses the structure of peer-to-peer markets
and how market players interact and benefit from the platforms.
Peer-to-peer platforms help sellers find matching buyers more efficiently and
thus reduce costs, especially for individuals and small businesses.10 For example,
Airbnb hosts only need to sign up for an account to have access to the client
5 Competition Act, RSC 1985, c. C-34 [Competition Act].
6 Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato, and Jonathan Levin, ‘‘Peer-to-PeerMarkets,”Working
Paper 21496 (Cambridge,MA:NationalBureau ofEconomicResearch, 2015) [Einav]: 1;
See alsoThe Sharing Economy Framework (2018), TheMinistry of Finance of Ontario at
3.
7 Airbnb is an online marketplace that enables hosts to publish their host services on the
Airbnb Platform and to communicate and transact directly with consumers seeking to
book such host services. See Airbnb “Terms of Service” (2019), online:Airbnb<https://
www.airbnb.ca/terms> at Section 1 [Airbnb].
8 The TaskRabbit Platform enables connections between consumers demanding short-
term task services and providers seeking to perform those tasks. See TaskRabbit Inc.
“Terms of Service” (2019), online: TaskRabbit Inc <https://www.taskrabbit.com/
terms>> at Section 1 [TaskRabbit Inc.].
9 SkipTheDishes is a platform allowing consumers to order food and drinks offered by
restaurants and store owners through the platform and the delivery of such orders
through independently contracted couriers who are also users of the platform. See
SkipTheDishes ‘‘Skip Platform Terms of Service“ (2019), online: SkipTheDishes
Restaurant Services Inc <https://www.skipthedishes.com/terms-of-service>> at Sec-
tion I.2 [SkipTheDishes].
10 The ‘‘Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators (2016),
Federal Trade Commission at 23.
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database and find matching consumers.11 In addition, many participants merely
sell or rent their underutilized property, goods, or services and sellers can choose
when to provide services. For example, a host can list a room on Airbnb
whenever it is not used for household purposes.12 Also, Uber’s platform helps
drivers bypass strict regulations on taxis, for example, taxi quotas, fares,
certificates and licenses, insurance, and inspections.13 This advantage allows
Uber to offer riders lower fares than a taxi for the same trip in a normal market
condition.14
A peer-to-peer market consists of a platform owner, buyers, and sellers. The
platform owner operates a technology-based marketplace that matches sellers
and buyers. The owner also sets out rules regulating the transactions between
sellers and buyers, providing solutions for situations in which either a request is
not confirmed by the seller, the seller does not provide a confirmed service, or
either party cancels the order.15
A buyer is a registered user using the platform to search for and buy services
offered by registered sellers.16 A buyer on some platforms must meet minimum
legal requirements to enter into a contractual relationship; for example, the buyer
must be an individual at least 18 years old or a duly organized legal entity.17
Someone who wants to purchase a product or service must sign up for an
account on the platform, provide the platform owner with their identity
including credit card information, and comply with terms and conditions set
forth by the platform owner.18
11 Airbnb ‘‘Rent out Your House, Apartment or Room on Airbnb” online: Airbnb





12 Airbnb, supra note 7, s 1.
13 Taxi, Ride-Sourcing and Ride-Sharing Services (2018), OECD, DAF/COMP/
WP2(2018)1 at 11.
14 See an example of fare comparison in Competition Bureau Canada, ‘‘Modernizing
Regulation in the Canadian taxi industry” (26 November 2015), online: Competition
Bureau Canada, <https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/
04007.html> section 2,. The comparison refers to prices in a normal market condition
because when demand exceeds supply, Uber will practice surge pricing. For more on
Uber’s surge pricing, see section 2(b) of this paper.
15 See, for example,SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at section II.3;TaskRabbit Inc., supra note
8 at s. 4;Airbnb, supranote 7 at s. 9; andUber,UberB.V.Terms andConditions forRiders
(2017) at s. 4 [Uber].
16 See e.g. Airbnb, supra note 7 at s. 1.1; Uber, supra note 15 at s. 4; and TaskRabbit Inc.,
supra note 8 at s. 1.
17 See e.g.Airbnb, supra note 7 at s. 2;Uber, supra note 15 at s. 4; andTaskRabbit Inc., supra
note 8 at Preamble.
18 See e.g. SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. I.3; TaskRabbit Inc., supra note 8 at Preamble;
Airbnb, supra note 7 at s. 4; and Uber, supra note 15 at s. 4.
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A seller in a peer-to-peer market is a registered member who owns assets for
rent or sale. A seller must also sign up for an account on the platform and
provide the platform owner with their identity, license, and proof showing that
the seller meets with all legal requirements for providing services, for example,
car insurance and driver’s license.19 Similar to buyers, sellers have to comply with
the platform owner’s terms and conditions, which considers sellers to be
independent third-party providers.
In peer-to-peer markets, sellers—but not the platform owners—are liable for
the quality of services provided to buyers. Platform owners generally make clear
statements in their terms of services that they are not a party in any contractual
relationship between sellers and buyers, nor are they brokers or service insurers.
Most platform owners also emphasize that sellers are not their employees,
partners, representatives, agents, joint venturers, independent contractors, or
franchisees.20
To enhance the quality of sellers’ services and the platform’s reliability,
platform owners allow buyers to review and rate sellers.21 At a general level, the
reviewing and rating system enables buyers to select reliable sellers, encourages
sellers to improve their services, and helps platform owners screen out
problematic sellers and buyers.22 For example, Uber reserves the right to not
allow a driver to access its app and services if the driver fails to increase his or her
average rating above a minimum average rating within a certain period of time.23
Although sellers transact directly with buyers when selling services, payments
are made through platform owners or payment service providers appointed by
the platform owners.24 Some owners clearly state in their terms of service that
they act as an agent of sellers solely for the purpose of collecting buyers’
payments.25
In sum, in a peer-to-peer market, buyers and sellers are registered users of a
platform and are bound by terms and conditions set out by the platform owner.
Sellers transact directly with buyers, and buyers are required to examine the
seller’s reputation and service quality before entering into a transaction.
19 See e.g. Uber, Technology Services Agreement (2015) at Section 2.2 [Uber Agreement];
TaskRabbit Inc., supra note 8 at s. 2; and SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. I.1.c.
20 See e.g. SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. 4.2;Uber, supra note 15 at s. 2;TaskRabbit Inc.,
supra note 8 at s. 1; and Airbnb, supra note 7 at s. 1.2.
21 See e.g.Uber, supranote 15 at s. 4;TaskRabbit Inc., supranote 8 at s. 6;Airbnb, supranote
7 at s. 10; and SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. I.4.
22 Einav, supra note 6 at 10.
23 Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at s. 2.5.2.
24 See e.g. SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. II.5; Airbnb, Payments Terms of Service (2019)
at s. 7.1; Uber, supra note 15 at s. 5; and TaskRabbit Inc., supra note 8 at s. 2 (User
Representations and Warranties).
25 See e.g.Uber, supra note 15 at s. 5;Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at s. 13.1; TaskRabbit
Inc., supra note 8 at s. 3; Airbnb, supra note 24 at s. 9.
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Payments are collected by platform owners or their authorized payment service
providers.
Uber’s platform, however, is distinguished from other peer-to-peer markets
in that it facilitates cartels that are per se unlawful under section 45(1) of the
Competition Act. The following sections will discuss the details of these cartels.
2. COLLUSIONS ORGANIZED BY UBER UNDER THE
COMPETITION ACT OF CANADA
Hard-core cartels are per se illegal under the Competition Act of Canada
regardless of the members’ aggregate market power and how they lessen or
prevent competition. Section 45(1) of the Competition Act provides that:
Every person commits an offence who, with a competitor of that person with
respect to a product, conspires, agrees or arranges
(a) to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for supply of the
product;
(b) to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the
production or supply of the product; or
(c) to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the produc-
tion or supply of the product.26
The following subsections will examine factors indicating that Uber’s
platform facilitates arrangements mentioned in paragraphs 45(1)(a) and (b) of
the Competition Act.
(a) Competitors with Respect to a Product
Section 45(8) of the Competition Act defines a competitor as ‘‘. . .a person
who it is reasonable to believe would be likely to compete with respect to a
product in the absence of a conspiracy.”27 According to Uber’s technology
service agreement, drivers are providers of transportation services to riders.28 A
ride request made via Uber’s platform will appear on nearby drivers’ screens. The
drivers have twenty seconds to be the first to accept the request by touching their
device’s screen when it flashes with a sound, and only one can be the service
provider.29 Uber drivers are, therefore, rivals competing with one another to
provide transportation services to riders as defined in section 45(8) of the
Competition Act.
26 Competition Act, supra note 5 at s. 45(1).
27 Ibid, s. 45(8).
28 Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at s. 1.12.
29 See Uber ‘‘How will I know when I’m getting a ride request? How do I accept?,
Frequently Asked Questions Before Your First Trip“ online: Uber, <https://www.u-
ber.com/drive/new-orleans/resources/prefirst-trip-faqs/> [Uber FAQ].
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While drivers participate in the Uber-led cartels as competing parties, Uber
plays the role of a non-competing party. The Canadian Competition Bureau
indicates in its guidelines that the competing parties may be prosecuted as cartel
members under section 45 of the Competition Act while non-competing parties
may also be prosecuted under section 45 as aiding and abetting parties.30 These
guidelines suggest that Uber may not be exempted from being characterized as a
cartel participant under section 45(1) of the Competition Act of Canada. The next
subsections examine in detail the collusions’ content, the role of drivers and
Uber, whether there is an agreement among them, and the illegality of the
conspiracies.
(b) Cartels that Allocate Markets and Fix the Price of Transportation
Services
The previous subsection suggests that, as providers of transportation
services, drivers are supposed to compete for riders. The Uber platform
nonetheless eliminates this competition, which results in effectively arranging
cartels among them. This subsection argues that the cartels exist to allocate
customers and fix prices. Although this subsection mentions conspiracies,
collusions, cartels, and agreements when referring to Uber’s arrangements with
drivers, it focuses only on the content of the conspiracies while subsection 2(c)
will examine why they are horizontal agreements and subsection 2(d) will argue
that they are naked restraints.
i) Allocating Customers
A peer-to-peer market is generally a place where a buyer can find a range of
sellers and transact with the most competitive one. When booking
accommodations on Airbnb, for example, a guest can access a number of
hosts with their detailed listings and select one that best suits his or her needs.31
Similarly, TaskRabbit allows a client to search and view service providers and
prices available in his or her area32 while a customer can select foods and drinks
from a list of vendors on SkipTheDishes.33
Uber, in contrast, does not provide riders with the ability to select drivers.
Instead, Uber only allows riders to make a ride request, which is then shared with
available drivers nearby. The drivers have to touch their device’s screen within
twenty seconds to be the only service provider.34 According to the Competition
30 Competition Bureau Canada, ‘‘Competitor Collaboration Guidelines” (23 December
2009), online: Competition Bureau Canada, <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/
site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03177.html> at s. 2.3a [Competition Bureau Canada].
31 Airbnb, ‘‘How do I Search for a Place to Stay?”online: Airbnb Help Centre <https://
www.airbnb.ca/help/article/252/how-do-i-search-for-a-place-to-stay>.
32 Taskrabbit Inc.,‘‘How Do I Hire a Tasker?” (15 November 2019), online: TaskRabbit
Support <http://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-ca/articles/210861763-How-Do-I-
Hire-a-Tasker->.
33 SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. II.3.
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Bureau, paragraph 45(1)(b) proscribes all forms of agreements that allocate
markets including collusions ‘‘. . .to not compete with respect to specific
customers, groups or types of customer, in certain regions or market segments, or
in respect of certain types of transactions or products.”35 By making a request via
Uber, a rider creates a market segment that has one customer in demand of
supplies from Uber drivers. This market is only available for nearby drivers that
are active on the Uber platform and match the rider’s options (these are called
‘‘eligible drivers”).36 The Uber platform functions as a cartel among Uber and
eligible drivers, allocating the customer to the driver who touches the screen
quickly enough to occupy the market. Once the market is occupied by one driver,
others will not compete no matter how competitive they are (see Diagram 1,
below). If the Uber platform did not facilitate market allocation cartels, all
eligible drivers that match a rider’s options could show up so that riders could
select the most competitive driver.
Therefore, Uber and its drivers allocate the customer of each ride request.
Drivers do not have to compete for riders by price or service quality. Their
competition is only to be the first driver to touch his or her screen to accept a
request. Allocating markets not only deprives riders of freedom of choice, but
also allows Uber and drivers to control and raise prices. The following section
will discuss how Uber and drivers control and increase fares through a system,
which functions differently from many other peer-to-peer platforms.
Diagram 1: Comparing the availability of providers in response to a
buyer’s need on Uber’s platform (left) and a competitive peer-to-peer
platform (right).
34 SeeUber FAQ, supra note 29 at “How will I know when I’m getting a ride request? How
do I accept?”.
35 Competition Bureau Canada, supra note 30, s. 2.4.3.
36 Uber allows riders to select options for preferred drivers or vehicles; for example, when a
rider requests a seven-seat car or a five-star driver, the platform will send the request to
only eligible drivers. In this analysis, filtering vehicles and drivers in response to a rider’s
options is not anticompetitive.
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(ii) Fixing Fares
Peer-to-peer platforms are generally marketplaces where prices are decided
by sellers. Airbnb, for example, sets out in its terms of service that the hosts ‘‘. . .
are solely responsible for setting a price.”37 Similarly, the prices of foods and
drinks provided through the SkipTheDishes platform are listed by food
vendors38 and the prices of tasks provided on TaskRabbit are decided by
sellers in negotiation with buyers.39 On these markets, platform owners neither
set the price of services nor intervene in sellers’ pricing decisions. To attract more
users, platform owners may provide users with gift cards and promotional codes
for buying the products and services with certain conditions.40
Uber, however, pre-arranges the price of rides using its platform. When
dealing with riders, ‘‘. . .Uber reserves the right to establish, remove and/or revise
charges for any or all services or goods obtained through the use of the services
at any time in Uber’s sole discretion.”41 Drivers are required to base their fare on
a pre-arranged fare calculated by the platform’s algorithms, which can be
changed any time at Uber’s discretion.42 This agreement between Uber and its
drivers violates section 45(1)(a) of the Competition Act, which prohibits
agreements between competitors in respect of a product ‘‘. . .to fix, maintain,
increase or control the price for the supply of the product.”43 According to The
Competition Bureau, this paragraph prohibits ‘‘. . .agreements to fix prices at a
predetermined level, to eliminate or reduce discounts, [and] to increase prices.”44
Pre-arranged fares, in essence, are the result of cartels that fix the price of
each ride at a predetermined level, eliminating price competition among drivers
to exploit riders. Although Uber has committed to ‘‘. . .respond accordingly to
any request from a [driver] to modify the charges for a particular service or
good,”45 riders cannot practically enjoy a lower fare for two reasons. Firstly,
because the driver who accepts a request is the sole provider for that particular
request and he or she can only know about the length of a trip when it ends, the
driver has no incentive to reduce the fare. Secondly, Uber’s app lacks features
allowing riders and drivers to reduce a trip’s price while a guide to Uber instructs
that when a rider makes a ride request, it is understood that the rider has
accepted the price shown in the app.46 Similarly, the drivers’ ‘‘Frequently Asked
Questions” do not explain how drivers can negotiate prices with riders.47
37 Airbnb, supra note 7 at s. 7.1.2.
38 SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. 6.
39 TaskRabbit Inc., supra note 8 at s. 4.
40 See e.g. TaskRabbit Inc., ibid, s. 5; and SkipTheDishes, supra note 9 at s. III.
41 Uber, supra note 15 at s. 5.
42 Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at ss. 4.1 and 4.2.
43 Competition Act, S.C., 2015, c. 3 2017 at para. 45(1)(a).
44 Competition Bureau of Canada, supra note 30 at para. 2.4.1.
45 Uber, supra note 15 at s. 4.
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In addition to fixing prices at a predetermined level, Uber-led cartels control
ride fares. Instead of having a feature facilitating negotiations for lower prices,
Uber’s surge pricing mechanism serves to increase the pre-arranged fares
whenever demand exceeds supply, making the price higher. When demand for
rides in a specific area is high, the platform will multiply the basic fare with a
surge multiplier of, for example, 1.3 or 2.1 times.48 Surge prices are based on
demand in real-time. Uber explains that in some situations, such as bad weather
or rush hour, the number of requests exceeds the number of cars available on the
road. Those who can afford a higher price can use the service immediately while
those who cannot pay surge prices must wait until the fares go back down to
normal.49 Although Uber explains that surge pricing serves to ‘‘. . .make sure
those who need a ride can get one,”50 it tends to equate ‘‘need” with having to
pay a higher price in a harsh condition.
One may argue that Uber’s price arrangements are ‘‘maximum resale price
maintenance,” which is not illegal per se.51 Maximum resale price maintenance
refers to a practice whereby a supplier requires its retailers to sell products no
higher than a ceiling price. Uber, however, clearly states in its agreements with
both drivers and riders that ‘‘. . .no joint venture, partnership, or agency
relationship exists between” Uber and drivers.52 This means drivers are not the
retailers of Uber or in any vertical relationship with Uber regarding the provision
of services to riders. Fares pre-arranged by Uber, therefore, should not be
considered maximum resale price maintenance but collusions that fix prices.
In sum, Uber’s technology service agreements serve to allocate customers
and fix the fares. The next subsection will examine whether there are agreements
among drivers.
(c) Horizontal Conspiracies Among Drivers and the Role of Uber
Section 45(3) of the Competition Act provides that:
46 Uber, ‘‘Accepting a Trip Price and How Fares Are Calculated“ online: Uber<https://
help.uber.com/riders/section/a-guide-to-uber>.
47 Uber FAQ, supra note 29.
48 ‘‘How Surge Pricing Works,” Uber, https://www.uber.com/ca/en/drive/partner-app/
how-surge-works/.
49 Ibid.
50 Uber, ‘‘What Is Surge?” online: Uber<https://help.uber.com/partners/article/what-is-
surge>.
51 Maximumresale pricemaintenance,which refers to vertical restraints,was deemedper se
illegal in the U.S. in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), 153, but the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled this decision and applied the rule of reason when examining
this practice in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). In Canada, resale price
maintenance is also not illegal per se. For more on resale price maintenance, see Larry
Markowitz, ‘‘Price Maintenance: The View from Canada” (March 2010), Distribution
Law Commission Newsletter, no. 1: 4.
52 Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at s. 13.1; and Uber, supra note 15 at s. 7.
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[T]he court may infer the existence of a conspiracy, agreement or
arrangement from circumstantial evidence, with or without direct evidence of
communication between or among the alleged parties to it, but, for greater
certainty, the conspiracy, agreement or arrangement must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.53
The Competition Bureau determines the existence of an agreement by
examining whether the parties reached a “meeting of the minds” when
participating in the alleged conspiracy.54 According to the Bureau, parallel
business practices in response to market trends and competitors’ behaviour is
insufficient to prove an agreement among conspirators.55 However, parallel
conduct in combination with practices such as sharing information may help to
prove the existence of an agreement under section 45(1). The Competition
Bureau acknowledges in a discussion paper that competitors can reach a cartel
agreement ‘‘. . .through deliberate collective use of an algorithm meant to reduce
competition,” for example, ‘‘. . .a ‘hub-and-spoke’ agreement between
competitors to use the same algorithm in maintaining prices for a large array
of products.”56 The Bureau, however, neither defines hub-and spoke collusions
nor explains how to determine an agreement among competitors in these
conspiracies, leaving these questions open with a note that reads:
[I]t is difficult to predict the ways in which [big data and algorithms] may
facilitate, or indicate the existence of, anti-competitive agreements or
arrangements. Each situation is case-specific and will depend on the particular
facts. Nonetheless, businesses face risks when they engage in facilitating practices
that lead to outcomes that mirror those that would be achieved through a hard-
core cartel.57
Hub-and-spoke conspiracies refer to cartels ‘‘. . .in which a firm (the hub)
organizes collusion (the rim of the wheel or the rim) among upstream or
downstream firms (the spokes) through vertical restraints.”58 Some scholars
consider conspiracies arranged by Uber hub-and-spoke collusions, but they have
not pointed out why Uber’s collusions with drivers are horizontal agreements.59
Unlike other conspiracies, the hub and rim of a hub-and-spoke arrangement
connect and coordinate collusions among spokes and thus the spokes may not
need to involve in direct communication with one another.60 Since Canadian
53 Competition Act, supra note 5 at s. 45(3).
54 Competition Bureau of Canada, supra note 30 at 6.
55 Ibid at 7.
56 ‘‘Big data and Innovation: Implications for Competition Policy in Canada“ (14
February 2018), Competition Bureau of Canada, (Innovation, Science and Economic
Development Canada, 2017): 10 [Big Data].
57 Ibid at 11—12.
58 Barak Orbach, ‘‘Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies,” Discussion Paper No. 16-11 (2016),
Arizona Legal Studies: 1.
59 See, for example, Huffman, supra note 3 at 862; See also Nowag, supra note 3 at 4.
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jurisprudence lacks precedents for hub-and-spoke collusions, this subsection
relies on section 45 and the technology service agreement between Uber and
drivers to argue that the drivers’ decisions are not parallel conduct but
agreements orchestrated by Uber.
While conscious parallelism refers to unilateral business decisions of
competitors as the result of market observations, Uber drivers can neither
observe market trends and the reaction of competitors nor make pricing
decisions.61 Therefore, the provisions of their services are not parallel practices
but business decisions orchestrated by Uber and regulated by the same set of
rules.62 Two factors indicate that drivers reach the ‘‘meeting of the minds” when
participating in Uber-led conspiracies.
Firstly, by participating in the platform and complying with Uber’s rules,
drivers accept that ‘‘. . .Uber [reserves] the right to establish, remove and/or
revise charges for any or all services or goods obtained through the use of the
services at any time in Uber’s sole discretion.”63 Drivers also agree that they will
not decide the price of their services, but base their fare on a pre-arranged fare
calculated by Uber’s algorithms.64 Uber, therefore, circulates an agreement to
the drivers so that they indirectly agree with one another that (i) Uber is the party
that sets and controls the price of their services, and (ii) only the one who first
accepts a ride request will be the service provider.
Secondly, Uber’s algorithms provide drivers with confidence that other
spokes are acting the same on the rim and that Uber can protect them from being
cheated. Drivers can only know about the details of a ride request after accepting
it and the platform lacks features for fare negotiations.65 Riders are also not
allowed to request any specific driver. Therefore, the spokes have peace of mind
when participating in the collusions organized by Uber.
One may argue that drivers should not be considered co-conspirators
because they are not required to be available on the platform permanently and
they spread throughout a country and even across countries.66 Two levels of
collusion among drivers and Uber should be analyzed. As previously discussed,
there is a collusion for each ride request so that only one among nearby drivers is
60 For e.g. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306U.S. 208 (1939) at 221; Toys “R”Us,
Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir., 2000) at 936; andUnited States of America v. Apple
Inc. et al, [2015] No. 13—3741—cv (L) at 58—59.
61 For more on parallel conduct, see Big Data, supra note 56 at 10.
62 TheU.S. SupremeCourt, for example, defined an illegal horizontal cartel as ‘‘a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” See
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Svc Corp., 465 US 752 (1984) at 764.
63 Uber, supra note 15 at s. 5.
64 Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at s. 4.1 and 4.2.
65 Ibid, s. 2.2.
66 See e.g. the arbitrator’s opinion in the arbitration case brought by the rider Spencer
Meyer against Uber Technologies Inc. to the American Arbitration Association in
Meyer, supra note 4 at 6.
COLLUSIONS ORGANIZED BY UBER: TIME FOR A CHANGE IN CANADA 299
allowed to respond to the rider’s request and the price is controlled by Uber no
matter who accepts the ride. For a given ride, the collusion does not involve all
drivers on the platform but only those who match the rider’s options. Ride-
specific collusions, however, derive from a uniform arrangement between drivers
and Uber when they entered into the technology service agreement, which is a
hub-and-spoke arrangement mentioned above. Drivers subscribing to the hub-
and-spoke arrangement are not required to be permanently active on the
platform, but whenever they are available for a ride request, they must act in
accordance with the hub-and-spoke arrangement.
The analysis of hub-and-spoke arrangements suggests that there are
agreements among drivers which are orchestrated by Uber. However, it is
possible that Uber drivers’ behavior is not illegal unless these agreements are
naked restraints. The next subsection will discuss the illegality of these collusions
under the Competition Act.
(d) Uber-led Cartels are Naked Restraints
Cartels that fix prices and allocate markets are per se illegal under section
45(1) of the Competition Act of Canada unless they are ‘‘. . .directly related to,
and reasonably necessary for giving effect to, the objective of that broader or
separate” legitimate agreement or arrangement carried out by the same parties. 67
The Competition Bureau generally considers the following agreements ancillary
restraints:
A non-compete clause found in an employment agreement, or an
agreement for the sale of assets or shares between parties;
An agreement among competitors to charge a common price in a
blanket license agreement for artistic works;
An agreement to abstain from making material changes to a business
pending the consummation of a merger; and
A non-compete obligation between the parent undertakings and a joint
venture where such obligations correspond only to the products,
services and territories covered by the joint venture agreement.68
Uber, however, emphasizes in its agreement on using the platform that
drivers are not in any employment, joint venture, partnership, or agency
relationship with Uber.69 Uber-led cartels are, therefore, not ancillary restraints
described above. The next discussion examines whether the collusions are
ancillary to technology services agreements between Uber and drivers.
67 Competition Act, supra note 5 at s. 45(4).
68 Competition Bureau of Canada, supra note 30 at s. 2.5.
69 Uber Agreement, supra note 19 at s. 13.1; and Uber, supra note 15 at s. 7.
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The function of Uber’s platform is to ‘‘. . .enable an authorized
transportation provider to seek, receive and fulfill requests for transportation
services from an authorized user of Uber’s mobile applications”70 and Uber ‘‘. . .
does not and shall not be deemed to direct or control” drivers.71 Uber-led
collusions are not ancillary to technology services agreements because limiting
the number of drivers available for a ride request and fixing fares are functionally
unnecessary and inconsistent with the purpose of the broader agreements
between Uber and drivers. Other peer-to-peer markets such as Airbnb and
TaskRabbit are still functional without depriving sellers of the right to set prices
or limiting the number of available service providers.
In addition, while the fundamental function of a peer-to-peer market is to
allow sellers to match with buyers faster and at lower costs and to let market
forces decide the price of services or products,72 Uber’s collusions make the
transportation services market less transparent so as to control and raise prices
whenever possible. The lack of features allowing riders and drivers to negotiate
fares indicates an intention to fix the price. Uber’s surge pricing mechanism aims
to exploit consumers in the absence of competition. Without Uber’s algorithms,
drivers could not figure out when demand exceeds supply, the extent to which
they should increase fares and for how long. By pre-arranging the fares, Uber
imposes its view of proper pricing and deprives the market of an ability to adjust
prices. Uber-led collusions are, therefore, not directly related to and reasonably
necessary for giving effect to the technology services agreements between Uber
and drivers.
3. SOME SOLUTIONS FOR THE UBER PLATFORM
In conclusion, in the author’s view, Uber organizes collusions among drivers,
allocating markets and fixing the fare of rides requested through its peer-to-peer
platform. These horizontal collusions are not ancillary restraints of any kind and
are thus illegal per se under the Canadian Competition Act. Uber can change its
legal relationship with drivers, apply technical solutions, or do both to eliminate
the illegality of its platform.
(a) Changing Legal Relationships
Given that Section 45(1) of the Competition Act only proscribes agreements
among competitors, the arrangements allocating markets and fixing fares would
not be considered cartels if Uber treated its drivers as employees. By treating
drivers as employees, Uber would be deemed a transportation services company
and would therefore be subject to the strict rules of the transportation industry.
The company would have to comply with employers’ obligations to drivers,
70 Ibid at 25.
71 Ibid, s. 2.4.
72 See discussion about peer-to-peer markets in section 1 of this paper.
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which may increase the cost of business and result in higher fares but would
provide drivers with employee benefits such as employment insurance.
(b) Technical Changes
Apart from considering drivers as employees, certain technical solutions may
help Uber to avoid antitrust lawsuits. The illegality of Uber’s platform lies in its
features that limit the number of available drivers for each ride request and
prevent riders and drivers from negotiating prices.
Uber, therefore, should allow more than one eligible driver to accept a ride
request. The rider could then view the accepting drivers with their number of
stars and average ratings and select a driver of their choice from among those
who accepted. Uber should also allow riders and drivers to adjust offered fares
by increasing or decreasing a suggested fare, perhaps by pre-determined
percentages. A rider requesting a short ride or a ride during rush hour or at
night could offer a price which is higher than the suggested fare to incentivize
drivers while new drivers who have a low number of stars and average ratings
could offer lower prices to gain more reputation. Having more drivers available,
riders can choose drivers based on whether they prioritize lower prices, better
ratings, or some balance of the two.
Uber should also provide drivers with the destination of ride requests before
accepting. This would make it easier for drivers and riders to negotiate prices. In
addition, it would increase efficiency by allowing drivers to accept rides in a
direction they are already headed. In practice, some drivers accept short trips
that take them out of their way and thus make losses, which then decrease their
service quality.73 One may argue that providing drivers with a trip’s destination
would allow drivers to cherry-pick longer rides, but cherry-picking is only a
problem when fares are pre-arranged. Drivers would not ignore a short trip if it
was on their way or if riders could incentivize them with appropriate fares.
Allowing drivers and riders to negotiate prices could also eliminate Uber’s
surge pricing mechanism. By making drivers compete on prices and service
quality and allowing riders to offer better prices, market forces will decide when
fares should increase and decrease.
73 See e.g. Indeed, ‘‘Uber Partner Drivers Employee Reviews” online: Indeed <https://
ca.indeed.com/cmp/Uber-Partner-Drivers/reviews>.
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